After the one-party, pro marxist FRELIMO govemment in Mozambique had converted to pluralist politics in November 1990, and following the triumphant march over of multi partyism in Zambia exactly a year later, attention swiftly shifted to Malawi's other neigh bour -Tanzania, which had suddenly become awkwardly conspicuous for pe rsisting in regarding multi-partyism undesirable. But Tanzania 
legal doctrine, the tendency is to regard the constitution as the "fundamental", "basic", "supreme" law of the land. As a consequence thereof and in accordance with the notion of "constitutional legitimacy", the existence of mies or practice conflicting with the constitu tion is deemed impermissible. As a matter of fact, the constitution represents such an important source of law that even international law is, from time to time, obliged to seek guidance if not authority from the constitution.
Akehurst points out to nationality as amongst those issues where international law relies on sources of municipal law. In order to determine, writes Akehurst, whether an individual is a national of state X, international law normally looks at the law of state X. 2 But further examples may be found in the field of diplomatic law and also, the law of treaties. Thanks to the institution of incorporation, important consummation procedures of these essentially international legal categories appear to distinctly lie within the normative embrace of constitutional law. For instance, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Articles 46 and 47 in particular), violation of constitutional limitations on com petence to make treaties invalidates the state's consent to be bound. One relevant implica tion of this rule appears to be the confirmation of the constitution as an important source of international law. Antonio Cassese's study bearing the title "Modem Constitutions and International Law" 3 may be regarded as additional proof of the significance of thc constitu tion as a source of international law.
And, as we shall have occassion to observe, the Malawi Republic Constitution of 1966 contains a fair share of incongruities and infractions that inavoidably beg the question of iL� legitimacy as weil as that of the attributes (such as an autocratic Presidcncy) of state power drawing authority on such a constitution.
One of the primary tasks before this author is to identify those provisions of the Malawi co nstitution that entrench and legitimize undemocratic notions and practice. Hut this task, we believe, would be better tackled by preliminarily, albeit bricfly, discussing the circum stances in which this constitution came into being, or more accurately, how Malawi became a One-Party State. Likewise, it would be in order to focus on some conceptual issues at this early stage. Ccntral to our discussion are concepts such as "democracy", "multi-partyism", "constitutional rights" and a few others. Since these are frequently interpreted in ways that are not only varied but incompatibly so, 4 there is evidently a necessity to throw light on these categories as regards their content.
2 Akehurst, M., A Modem lntroduction to International Law, 6th ed., 1987, p. 43. 3 Cassese, A., Constitutions and International Law, Recueil des Cours, 1985-lß., Vol. 192. 4 See for example, the T. Mkandawire / P. Anyang' N yo ng'o debate in the pages of Codesria Bulle tin No. 2, 1991.
Divergent views abound, for example, in explaining why multi-partyism is desirable, in fact so desirable that world wide, its enshrinement in the supreme law of the land (the constitu tion, that is) is being vigorously sought. With this in mind we offer the following hypo theses to summarize the conceptual frame work within which these terms are understood, and within which the struggle for legitimizing political opposition in Malawi is being perceived.
1. Power belongs to the people Political power derives its legitimacy5 from the people, on whose behalf and in whose interest duly constituted organs of state power govem. lt is rulers who remain at all times answerable before the electorate and not vice versa, which regrettably is the case in Malawi. Subsequently, the "divine" origins of the ruling MCP's monopoly of power or the institution of a life presidency, whose candidate the Constitution (Art. 9) refers by name, can only be outrageous perversions of both the law, reason and justice.
Opposition and dissent
Institutionalized opposition is a vital legal safeguard at the disposal of the govemed (both as a collective, and in their individual capacity) in exercising control and influence over the rulers whose propensity to abuse instruments of power is nothing but phenomenal. This crucial legal and political institution implies and is complemented by the following basic rights and freedoms: freedom of speech, association and assembly; freedom of conscience and expression; and the right to information.
3. Right to participate in govemment If the rulers draw their authority and legitimacy from popular mandate, it is only logical to expect that the latter would be at liberty to choose their political representatives, or alter natively, be equally free to contest for public office themselves. The right to participate equally implies and includes the right to censure those persons guilty of abusing thc powers vested in them. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the right to participate would be rendcrcd uscless if no provision was made for impeachment 4. Multi-partyism and democracy Despite close lies, the two are quite distinct, 6 each anchored in a socio-economic system of its own and necessarily reflecting all the connotations attending on these systems and the epoch of its emergence. If the notion of "democracy" was conccived in antiquity, that of "multi-party political system" is a relatively new phenomenon having been dcviscd in Europe of the capitalist mode of production. To conclude, as some crroneously do, that multi-partyism is synonymous with democracy or that it is an end in itself, appears misguided. Arguably, multi-partyism is a salient feature of a democratic society but it ought not necessarily be either equated to or confused for democracy itself. Multi-partyism becomes desirable in so far as it embodies a reaffirmation of the people 's sovereign right to determine who is to govem and how affairs of state are to be run.
Another important matter worth discussing at this early stage is related to the circumstances in which opposition was bestardized. that is, constitutionally declared unlawfnl Two important facts of history need be pointed out. Firstly, it will be recalled (perhaps surpris ingly) that Malawi had in fact inherited a multi-party system from its former colonial power, the British. Secondly, despite noises to the contrary, Malawi became a One-Party state clearly not through a mechanism that took into account (Jet alone facilitate such) the opinion of all voting age Malawians, that is, by popular mandate. Rather, it was achievcd through legislative fiat which was supplemented by a delibcrate policy of "harrassing thc other political parties out of existence". And these parties, in the government's own unwitting admission, were the Christian Liberation Party, the Congress Liberation Party and the United Federal Party (UFP).7 But while recognizing Malawi 's "multi-party heritage", Malawian authorities continue to insist that the multi-party system was abolishcd as a response to the people's wish.
According to this argument, only the MCP and the UFP survived the 1961 elections, with the latter however disbanding two years later following the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which it supported. 'This is how thc Malawi Congrcss Party came to be the only political Party in this country", the argument concludes lamely. This assertion strongly contradicts evidence gathered from official recordings of legislature proccedings which indicate quite unambiguously that as late as 1963, the country continucd to remain a plural society. Alongside MCP parliamentarians four Nyasaland Constitutional Party members sat in the Nyasaland Legislature.8
Having responded to the "official version" as to how Malawi 's disastrous transition from multi-partyism to the MCP's illegitimate monolithic grip over the nation 's political life, we may now rctum to what we feel were the genuine determinants. And these are:
1) struggles within the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) leadership;
2) the colonial and missionary element; 3) influences of the "charismatic leader" doctrine, and 4) cunning scheming on the part of Kamuzu Banda.
7 Daily Times (Blantyre), November 6, 1992. 8 Hansard (Zomba), July 10, 1963.
In the early to mid SO's the NAC leadership found itself ensnared in one acrimonious debate after another, 9 debates quite capable of weakening the nationalist movement and worse still, jeopardizing chances for an early atuinment of independence. Subsequently, it became strategically im po rtant to speedily seek the leadership of a "neutral outsider" generally acceptable to all the waring factions, to safeguard cohesion. At the same time, the SO's was a turbulent period in Africa's po litical relations with its colonial masters. Nation alist struggles and movements became an issue of particular concem to the metro po l whose privileged status within these territories was being challenged ever more defiantly. The po ssibility of being confronted with the combined forces of the national liberation movement and "communism" must have created phenomenal headaches in London, Paris, Lisbon, Brussels and New York.
Nyasaland was one such territory that could be manipulated by "Communists", and thus the necessity for British imperial authorities to have their surrogate at the heim of the Nyasa land independence movement. 10 And it was the missionary 11 that identified the personality most suitable for this ignominous role. In addition to this, the regional po litical heavy weights of the day, racist colonial regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique all of which were seriously being threatened by local liberation movements, also required a collaborator.
Two more factors were to be crucial in the emergence of Kamuzu Banda as indisputed leader of the NAC which is viewed as the most decisive element in Malawi's transition to mono-partyism: influences of the "charismatic (omni po tent) leader" doctrine, and cunning scheming on the part of Banda Hastings Banda had not only been scheming12 to become the next ruler of Nyasaland, thus putting into effcct his po litical, economic and moral ideals. Within the NAC leadership and especially (unfortunately?) amongst its most enlightened section, unjustifiably enormous pre-eminence was attached to the "charismatic leader" doctrine. Kanyama Chiume, who was undoubtedly amongst the most intluential figures of the movement and, until falling out in 1964, was a close confidant of Banda, is The emphasis on Kamuzu Banda's personality as th e most decisive determinant in the nation's political fate is not accidental. This article is premised on the recognition of the preponderant influence of the subjective element (leader's political outlook) over the objective (Malawi 's colonial heritage, land-locked situation and poverty). More pertinently, I intend to argue that more than any other factor, it is Banda's appearance on the Malawian political landscape and ultimate emergence as an implacable, ruthless, seif willed autocrat that has been the primary causative factor in Malawi's transition to mono-partyism and the horrid human rights violations that distinguish the Malawian political system. This is far from suggesting that once he ascended to power the President was free to mould the coun try' s political system in total disregard to limitations of the objective world. What we are saying is that in this particular case, when the objective factors are weighed against the subjective, one is left convinced that rather than the former, it is Bandaism which has exerted the greater impact in shaping state policies and practice. And this most interesting phenomenon has been made possible thanks to Banda's ingenuity at interpreting Malawi's objective reality through the prism of his arch conservative, reactionary, parochial world outlook.14 For, it is an inescapable truth that while confronted by analogically debilitating objective reality, most, if not all of the region's governments nevertheless proceeded to formulate policies and create institutions distinct from Malawi's.15 From an exceedingly repressive political system, an excruciatingly exploitative economic system, adceply strati fied social set up, to a rabidly reactionary foreign policy, it is as if Malawi has set itsclf the dubious goal of seeking distinction of excesses.
Enough on the historical setting from which sprung a constitution extremely hostilc to opposition. Now an attempt will be made to identify those constitutional provisions parti cularly prejudicial to the democratization process, provisions that a future Constitutional Commission may want to bring under scrutiny. contains no provision expressly prohibiting the existence of political parties other than the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Yet even the most cursory examination of section 4(1) and 4(2) leads one to conclude conclusively that opposition is both unconstitutional and illegi timate. In fact, one comes out with the distinct impression that the constitution is intolerant to dissent even when this shall come from within the MCP. Section 4(1) reads: 'There shall be in the Republic [of Malawi] ... only one National Party". Section 4{2) was most probably inserted to dispel any doubts that may arise as to the identity of this National Party whosc monopoly of political power is being institutionalized and politically deitified. Here, the Constitution stipulates: 'The National Party shall be the Malawi Congress Party".
Having so unambiguously legalized the MCP's political exclusivity, in what could weil be the result of oversight on the part of Constitution makers, we find provisions in the same constitution which, when examined closely, tend to challenge the MCP's privileged position and illegitimization of opposition to the ruling party. Section (2) Another provision giving ground to question the constitutional illegalization of opposition is tobe found in section 2(1), which reads:
'The Government and people of Malawi shall continue to recognize the sanctity of the personal liberties enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of adhcrence to the Law ofNations."
Of course, some writers, and Eleanor Rooseveltl7 is one of them, outrightly rcject the binding nature of the Dcclaration, categorizing it as a mere "common standard of achievement", a position more or less shared by Starke. lt is none the lcss significant to obscrve that while the latter insists that "the Declaration could not and did not purport to be more than a manifesto, a statement of ideals, a pathfinding instrument", he continues to point out that the Tchran United Nations Conference on Human Rights procccdcd to dcclare that the Dcclaration constitutcd an obligation for thc membcrs of the international community. 18 But it is Harris' contra argument which appears the more convincing and he advances four rcasons for regarding the Declaration "source of rules of customary inter national law". Judicial practice, in Harris' opinion, does regard the Declaration as a legally binding instrument. And this is a distinct possibility, for there is a discemible belief that multi-partyism is the icing (if not the very cake) on the "democratic pie". But as we have attempted to argue, democracy goes beyond creating the avenues through which opposition parties may march into State House. Democratic govemance, it is submittoo, will be achieved there and when a people has recaptured the constitutive power, and secondly, accountability of the rulers before the ruloo has been reaffirmoo.
As Malawians set out to create a democratic society that is in their image and interest, it would be a worthwhile exercise to reflect on factors that led to the adoption of a constitu tion requiring them to pay allegiance to an imperial President who is also a despot par excellence. Malawians will be pleasantly surprisoo to leam that by electing to ad ap t the In comparison to the panorama in neighbouring States (Tanzania and Zambia in particular), the pro-democracy struggle in Malawi is in a "pre-historic stage". Malawian authorities pcrsist in derogatorily referring to those Malawians sceking democratic change as "dissidcnts". In addition, the authorities hypocritically portray the multi-party system of govemment as likely to "disrupt the prevailing peace and harmony" while weil aware that it is the govemment's intransigency in accepting change that is likely to tri gg er a conflagara tion. 
Countries such as

